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Joyner: Alimony: Income Taxation of Installment Payments
ALIMONY TAXATION

ALIMONY: INCOME TAXATION OF INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS
In recent years several states' have enacted legislation simplifying the
divorce process. 2 A corresponding simplification of the tax consequences
incident to divorce has not occurred, however. Rather, judicial interpretations of two apparently simple code provisions3 have greatly confused the
law relative to installment payments of alimony,4 a typical means of satisfying a husband's divorce obligations. 5 Although such payments are generally
not deductible by the husband or includable by the wife in computation
of their respective taxable incomes,6 sections 71 and 215 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 may provide otherwise.7
The purpose of this note is to inform the practitioner of the tax consequences attending installment payments of alimony by analyzing the judicial
treatment of such payments. With such an understanding, the practitioner
may gain a measure of control over the tax treatment accorded the payments
and thereby achieve the results that are most beneficial to his client.
SECTION 71 REQuEMENTS
In general, the tax treatment accorded alimony payments is determined
by section 71.8 For payments to be deductible by the husband and includable
by the wife the section requires the coexistence of three elements: a legitimate
decree9 or agreement, 10 a notion of periodicity," and the satisfaction of a
legal support obligation.2
1. CAL. Crv. CODE §4500 (West Supp. 1970); IowA STAT. §597 (1970); Colo. Sess. Laws
1971, ch. 130; Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241.
2. E.g., Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241, §§1, 6, 7 substituted the phrase "irretrievably broken"
for the prior numerous grounds for divorce, thereby abolishing certain defenses, which may
otherwise have prevented the divorce decree.
3. INT. Rzv. CODE or 1954, §§71, 215 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
4. Note, Taxation of Alimony, 16 HASTrWGs L.J. 608 (1965). One reason for the unpredictability of the tax treatment of installment payments is the absence of uniformity in the
characterization of marital property rights under state law.
5. CODE §7701 (a) (17) gives the following definition of husband and wife for purposes
of the alimony provisions: "[I]f the husband and wife therein referred to are divorced,
wherever appropriate to the meaning of such sections, the term 'wife' shall be read
'former wife' and the term 'husband' shall be read 'former husband'; and, if the payments described in such sections are made by or on behalf of the wife or former wife to
the husband or former husband instead of vice versa, wherever appropriate to the meaning
of such sections, the term 'husband' shall be read 'wife' and the term 'wife' shall be read
'husband."'
6. Ashcraft v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 200, 204 (7th Cir. 1958); Smith's Estate v.
Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 1953).
7. See notes 9, 10, 12 and accompanying text infra.
8. CODE §71.
9. Although Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241, §7, at 972 refers to a "judgment of dissolution
of marriage" while the Code refers to a "decree of divorce" these two phrases may be
used interchangeably.
10. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (b) (2) (1957). Although such payments must be received pursuant to a post-1954 agreement, the written agreement need not be legally enforceable. The
parties, however, cannot file a joint return.
11. See text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
12. CODE §71 (a) (1) states: "(1) DEzcRt
oF DivoRcE OR SE.PARATz MAsINrNA cE.-If a
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The Decree or Agreement
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 installment payments of alimony were deductible by the husband only if such payments were "incident
to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance."'"3 The 1954 revision of the
Code expanded this requirement to include those payments pursuant to a
decree for support 14 or occasioned by a written agreement between the
spouses.15 Since this liberalization, most alimony payments will satisfy the
statutory requisite.
The Periodicity Requirement
Although Congress failed to define the term "periodic payments,"' 6 the
Code specifically excluded from its purview installment payments in discharge of an obligation where the principal sum was specified in the decree.' 7

wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not
made at regular intervals) received after such decree in discharge of (or attributable to
property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation which,
because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband
under the decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation."
"Family" as used in the Code refers to a general rule that brings all alimony payments within the wife's income unless that payment is excluded by another section of the
Code. CODE §71 (b) excludes payments for child support from the wife's income and concurrently precludes the husband from obtaining a deduction for his payments of child
support. In Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961), the Supreme Court held that
child support payments paid to the wife are alimony unless the payment or a portion
thereof is specifically designated for child support.
CODE §71 (a) (2) states: "WRIrrEN SEPARATION AOREEMENT.-If a wife is separated from
her husband and there is a written separation agreement executed after the date of the
enactment of this title, the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or
not made at regular intervals) received after such agreement is executed which are made
under such agreement and because of the marital or family relationship (or which are
attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such agreement and because of such relationship)."
CODE

§71 (a) (3) states: "DEcREE

FOR SUPPoRT.-If

a wife is separated from her husband,

the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular
intervals) received by her after the date of the enactment of this title from her husband
under a decree entered after March 1, 1954, requiring the husband to make the payments
for her support or maintenance. This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife
make a single return jointly." Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (b) (3) (1957) does not require the parties
to be legally separated. Therefore payments of alimony pendente lite are within this code
section. See Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241, §9, at 973.
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241, §12 refers to "alimony unconnected with the divorce." This
term is synonymous with a decree for support.
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §22 (k), 56 Stat. 816 (now CODE §71).

14.

CODE

§71 (a) (3).

15. CODE §71 (a) (2).
16. This omission has resulted in much litigation and subsequent confusion. See generally 5 J. MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §31A.01 (1969).

17.

CODE

§71 (c)(1).
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This exclusion, however, is subject to two important exceptions. First, where
the principal sum is to be paid in installments over a period exceeding ten
years, Congress has declared the payment to be periodic.' s Second, under a
judicial exception, installment payments of a principal sum not specified in
a decree or agreement are deemed periodic.19 Thus, for the installment
payments to be periodic and therefore deductible by the husband, they must
fall within either the congressional exception known as the "ten year-ten
per cent rule" or the judicial exception known as the "contingencies rule."
Congressional Exception - The Ten Year-Ten Per Cent Rule. Prior to
the passage of the Revenue Act of 1942 alimony payments received by a wife
were neither included within her income nor deductible by the husband.2o
Because the Act provided for increased tax rates and thereby increased
the tax burden of the husband, Congress amended the 1939 Code to allow
the husband a deduction for periodic payments of alimony.2 1 This amendment was based on two considerations. First, without the deduction the
husband might have insufficient funds with which to meet his own income
tax obligation.22 Second, the deduction was thought proper since Congress
presumed that the payments would be paid from the husband's annual
income.23 To qualify for the deduction, however, the periodic payments
must satisfy the following two tests: the principal sum must be paid over a
period in excess of ten years, 24 and the amount of the installment payment
that is characterized as periodic for any one taxable year may not exceed
ten per cent of the principal sum. 25 Although the congressional ten year-ten
per cent rule is mechanistic in operation, subsequent case law has emphasized
the need for careful planning with regard to the date the payments are to
18. CODE §71 (c)(2): "If, by the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the
principal sum . ..is to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than 10 years
from the date of such decree, instrument, or agreement, then.., the installment payments
shall be treated as periodic payments . . . but (in the case of any one taxable year of
the wife) only to the extent of 10 per cent of the principal sum."
19. E.g., Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. See H.R. RP'. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1952). Until 1942 alimony payments
were not deductible by the husband nor taxable to the wife unless the divorce decree completely terminated the husband's liability for support and maintenance under local law.
E.g., Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 546 (1942).
21. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §22 (k), 56 Stat. 816 (now CODE §71).
22.

Hearing on the Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Committee on Ways

and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1942).
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §22 (k), 56 Stat. 816 (now CODE §71).
24. CODE §71 (c)(2). By requiring the payments to extend over a period that exceeds
ten years and by limiting the periodic portion of each payment to 10%, Congress apparently
attempted to insure annual payments of nearly identical amounts. For example, if the
principal sum is $10,000 and is to be paid over 10 years in equal annual installments, then
the husband will receive annual deductions of $1,000. If, on the other hand, he should
pay $2,000 each of the first two years and $750 in each of the last 8 years, the amount of
his §71 deduction for each of the first two years will be 10% of the $I0,000 or $1,000. However, for each of the last eight years his deduction will only be $750. Thus, he will lose
$2,000 in total deductions. See also Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (5) (example 4) (1957).
25.

CODE §71 (c) (2).
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begin and end. 26 Because the ten year period begins at the "date of such
decree, instrument or agreement" 27 and not the actual payment date,28 meticulous planning is essential. The lack of federal guidelines for the determination of this date has forced the tax courts to utilize the date when
the decree or agreement becomes effective under local law.2 9 Where the parties
enter into an agreement prior to the date of the decree of divorce, 30 or the
divorce decree merely incorporates a prior agreement, 31 the ten year period
generally begins as of the date of the agreement. However, when the agreement is conditioned upon a subsequent divorce decree, the running of the
ten year period will not commence until the date of the decree.32 In
Spicknall's Estate v. Commissioner the pre-divorce agreement specified that
the alimony payments were not to begin until the date of the decree. 3
Although it would seem that the payments in Spicknall were dependent upon
the subsequent decree, the court found that the parties had entered into an
enforceable contract as of the date of the agreement 34 and allowed the running of the ten year period from that date. Consequently, the ten year period
will begin when the obligation becomes enforceable under state law, not
at the actual commencement time specified by the parties.35 In William M. Joslin the parties entered into a pre-divorce agreement for post-divorce alimony
payments. 36 The Tax Court found that under local law the parties could not
bind themselves to post-divorce payments by a pre-divorce agreement and
37
held that the ten year period did not begin until the date of the decree.
If a divorce decree is modified on appeal, state law may provide that the
ten year period runs from the date of the modified decree. 38 In those
instances where state law prevents the agreement from becoming effective on
the agreement date, a new agreement may have to be executed if there is a
delay in the divorce proceedings. This is especially true where the delay will
26. See note 27 and accompanying text infra.
27.

CODE §71 (c) (2).

28. E.g., William M. Joslin, 52 T.C. 231 (1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1970).
29. Spicknall's Estate v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1961); Lillard v. Wiseman,
57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9282 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Gordon M. Eno, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1122
(1965).
30. Spicknall's Estate v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1961).
31. Commissioner v. Blum, 187 F.2d 177 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951).
32. Marie M. Newman, 26 T.C. 717 (1956), aff'd, 248 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1957).
33. 285 F.2d 561, 562 (8th Cir. 1961).
34. Id. at 563.
35. See cases cited note 29 supra.
36. 52 T.C. 231 (1969). A separation agreement was entered into on January 21, 1960.
It provided for a series of installment payments, the final payment due on March 1, 1970.
The divorce decree was entered on March 15, 1960. In using the date of the divorce
decree instead of the date of the separation agreement, the "more than ten year test"
was not met, and the husband was denied a deduction for those alimony payments.
37. Id. at 238.
38. Gordon M. Eno, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1122, 1124 (1965). The monthly payments
began July 1, 1954, and were to run for 10 years with the final payment due July 1964. The
modified decree was rendered on October 22, 1954, and the installment payments were
therefore not spread over a period of more than 10 years. The husband was denied the
deduction for the amounts paid.
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cause the installment payments to be paid in less than a ten year period from
the date of the decree although the intent of the parties was to make the
payments extend beyond ten years from the date of the agreement.39
While the determination of the date on which the ten year period begins
is dependent on local law, the agreement, decree, or instrument itself determines whether the principal sum is to be paid or may be paid over a
period ending more than ten years from the date of the initial payment. 40
This determination is made from the face of the instrument or decree, and
the actual payment date is immaterial. 41 It is therefore essential that the
parties use language in the decree or agreement that clearly describes the
desired characterization of the installment payments as either periodic or
non-periodic. The failure to use explicit language in the agreement or decree
resulted in a contrary characterization of installment payments in United
States v. Reis 42 and John A. Isfalt.43 In Reis the decree of divorce, which was
dated March 24, 1947, provided for ten years of monthly installment payments to commence "on the first day of each month."- The court interpreted "commencing on the first day" to mean the monthly payment
could be paid on the last day of the month even though the payment was
due on the first of the month. It thus held that the payments might be paid
over a period of more than ten years. 45 Consequently, the payments were
characterized as periodic although payments made on the first of each month
would have resulted in an actual payment period of less than ten years.
In John A. Isfalt the decree stated that each payment "shall be made on the
first of each month."46 Although "shall be made" seems as flexible as "commencing on," the Tax Court held that the payments were required on the
first of each month. 47 Therefore, the payments were characterized as non-

39. See notes 36, 38 and accompanying text supra. In Florida marital settlements in
advance of divorce were against public policy because they were thought to facilitate and
promote divorce. Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 518, 114 So. 371, 372 (1927). Florida
courts have since receded from that position and have held that pre-divorce agreements
made in good faith, free from fraud, deceit or trickery and relating to alimony can and
will be upheld by the courts. Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 726, 7 So. 2d 9, 11 (1942);
Rice v. Rice, 148 Fla. 620, 4 So. 2d 850 (1941). Thus, the ten year period will begin
on the date of the pre-divorce agreement. See also Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 531 (Fla.
1972).
40. Ellert v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1962). The word "may" in the
phrase "may be paid" relates to the decree or agreement.
41. Robert D. Stecker, 31 T.C. 749 (1959). The possibility of the husband's noncompliance with the terms of the agreement is not considered in determining whether the
principal sum may be paid over a period of more than ten years.
42. 214 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1954).
43. 24 T.C. 497 (1955).
44. 214 F.2d 327, 328 (10th Cir. 1954).
45. The date of the decree was March 24, 1947, and the payments were to begin on
April 1, 1947. If the husband had made the final payment on March 1, 1957, the period
would have been less than ten years.
46. 24 T.C. 497, 498 (1955).
47. Id. at 501.
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periodic because the due date for the last payment was not "more than
ten years from the date of the decree or agreement." 4s
Care must therefore be exercised when drafting the commencement and
termination dates of the ten year period. For payments to be characterized as
periodic, the agreement should expressly spread the installment payments
over a period extending more than ten years from the effective date of the
decree, agreement, or instrument. Installment payments, the principal sum
of which is to be paid over a period of less than ten years, will not be deemed
49
periodic unless the payments are subject to a contingency.
Even if the installment payments satisfy the "more than ten year" test,
the amount of the installment payment that will be considered periodic is
limited to ten per cent of the entire alimony obligation specified in the
governing instrument.-r However, this general rule appears to have three
exceptions: where the installment payments are for arrearages of alimony,61
where the husband and wife are on different taxable years,9 2 and where one
or more contingencies are present. 63
The payment of a sum in settlement of overdue periodic payments is
considered to be a payment of arrears. 54 Payments to the wife, which are
allocable to prior taxable years, are treated as if they had been paid in the
proper taxable year. 55 In order to circumvent the ten per cent limitation the
husband can delay the payments until they are past due. The net effect of
the arrearage exception is to penalize the alimony receiving spouse5- and place
on her the burden of harassing the husband into paying the installment on
time.57 Moreover, while the gross economic position of the parties is not
affected by the arrearage exception, the income ramifications are nonetheless
dramatic because of the progressive rate structure of the federal income tax.

48. CODE §71 (c) (2). The agreement was entered into April 18, 1950, with the first
payment to begin May 1, 1950. The last payment was therefore due on April 1, 1960,
making the period over which the installments were to be paid less than ten years. John A.
Isfalt, 24 T.C. 497, 501 (1955).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (4) (1955).
50. Helen L. Hilgemeier, 42 T.C. 496 (1964); CODE §71 (c) (2); Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (2)
(1957).
51. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (2) (1954). See also note 54 and accompanying text infra.
52. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text inIra.
53. E.g., Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
54. Cf. Gale v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
55. Jane C. Grant, 18 T.C. 1013 (1952), aff'd, 209 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1953). Treas. Reg.
§§1.71-1 (b) (5), 1.215-1 (1957) place both husband and wife on a cash basis with respect
to alimony payments regardless of their regular reporting method. Therefore, the husband
receives a deduction only in the year of actual payment. Because of this arrearage exception
the husband is encouraged to bunch his alimony deduction to offset a year in which his
income is expected to be higher.
56. See Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d)(2) (1957); Rev. Rul. 55-457, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL 527.
See also CODE §1 (c). Since the wife must include in her income all payments received in
each tax year, her actual tax burden is increased through the graduated tax rates when
the husband bunches alimony payments in any one year.
57. See note 56 supra. See also Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241, §§14, 17, which require the wife
to initiate the action to enforce the payment of past due alimony.
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When the husband is delinquent the wife is faced with a less attractive
after-tax income than when the payments are timely.58 Furthermore, a
husband may be expected to shift the payment of his obligation to those
years in which his expected income will be higher in order to obtain a
larger deduction for alimony payments.
The ten per cent limitation also appears to be inapplicable where the
husband and wife are on different taxable years. 59 The husband, by making
two payments to the wife that are taxable to her in different years but are
paid in one taxable year by him, may receive a deduction for any one year
that may be more or less than ten per cent of the "principal sUm."6 0 As in

58. See note 56 supra.
59. Treas. Reg. §§1.71-1(b)(5), 1.215-1 (1957) place all taxpayers on a cash basis
for the receipt or payment of alimony. See also Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d)(2) (1957) where
the 10% limitation is applied only to those installment payments received during any one
taxable year of the wife. Where the parties are on different taxable years the husband
could make two payments within his single taxable year although the payments would be
spread over two of the wife's taxable years. His deduction in any one taxable year could
therefore be more or less than 10% of the principal sum.
60. For example, a June 30 fiscal year husband makes installment payments of a principal
sum to a calendar year wife. The payments and the amount includable in the wife's income
and hence deductible by the husband appear to be as follows:
Calendar
Years

Per cent of
Principal Sums
Paid

Total Includable
by Wife in
Calendar Years

10%
9%

10%

nil

Ist June
July
2nd June
July
3rd June
July
4th June
July
5th June
July
6th June

Totals

19%
9%
nil

9%
9%

9%
18%
9%
nil

9%
9%71

9%91
18%

9%

July
7th June
July
8th June
July
9th June
July
10th June
July
l1th June
July
12th June

Total Includable
by Husband in
Years Ended June
30th

nil
9%
9%0/

9%
18%
9%
nil

9%
9%

9%
18%
9%
nil

9%

9%91
9%

100%
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the case of arrearage payments, the ten per cent limitation would seem to be
circumvented by manipulating the time of the payments. 61 However, when
the parties are on different taxable years the net after-tax income of the
wife is not drastically changed because she receives only one payment within her taxable year.
A third factual context also avoids the ten per cent rule. Where payments are to be made over a period of more than ten years but are payable
subject to contingencies such as the death of either spouse, the remarriage
of the wife, or a change in the economic status of either of the spouses, the
rule is inapplicable.62 The existence of such contingencies will allow the
husband to deduct the full amount of the installment payment without
regard to the ten per cent limitationr3 Thus, if a principal sum due the
wife is payable in installments subject to discontinuance after the wife's
remarriage, the total amount of the installment payment is periodic and
64
hence deductible by the husband.

Although installment payments of alimony may fail to qualify as periodic
payments under the ten year-ten per cent rule, they may still qualify pursuant to a judicial exception to the general rule of non-deductibility.
Judicial Exception - The Contingencies Rule. When Congress amended
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code to make payments of alimony includable
by the wife and deductible by the husband, the Senate adopted a substantial portion of the House bill.65 The Senate revised the House bill,66 however, to provide that installment payments would not be deemed periodic
unless the principal sum was to be paid over a period of more than ten
years. 67 This change in terminology resulted in a presumption that installment payments were not periodic.68 A series of conflicting determinations
of whether installment payments, payable over less than ten years were
periodic, arose from this presumption.69 These conflicting decisions resulted

§K-6120, at 32,209 (1967).
61. For example, a husband may plan on bunching payments in order to offset his
income for years in which it is higher than normal.
62. Rev. Rul. 60-121, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 30.
63. Treas. Reg. §1.71-I (d) (4) (1957).
64. Rev. Rul. 60-250, 1960-2 Cur. BULL. 435.
65. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942). The Senate revised the House bill,
which had provided that installment payments were periodic payments unless the principal
sum of the obligation was required to be paid within a period of ten years. See also H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, 72 (1942).
66. See note 65 supra.
67. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942). See also 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 569
(Comm. Report).
68. See note 65 supra. Whereas the House bill provided that installment payments were
presumed to be periodic unless required to be paid within ten years, the final bill allowed
only those installment payments paid over ten years to be periodic.
69. E.g., Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Helen Stewart Cramer,
36 T.C. 1186 (1961); Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308 (1950); J. B. Steinal, 10 T.C. 409
(1948).
TAX COORDINATOR
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from varying judicial interpretations of whether a principal sum was specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement.70
The Tax Court, in several of its early cases, developed the "mathematical
calculability test," 71 which defined the term "principal sum" as any aggregate sum mathematically ascertainable. 72 According to the Tax Court, installment payments were not periodic if a specific amount was stated in the
decree 73 or was calculable from the face of the decree. 74 This test was
eventually challenged in the appellate courts. In Baker v. Commissioner,75
where the payments were subject to discontinuance upon the wife's death
or remarriage, the Tax Court, following its earlier decision, concluded that
the installment payments were not periodic.76 The Second Circuit reversed
and stated that the language "principal sum specified in the decree" dearly
implied an amount of a fairly definite character and did not carry any suggestion of uncertainty.77 The payments were held to be periodic because the possibility of the wife's remarriage was a contingency wholly within the control
of the wife8 Although clearly reluctant to allow the contingencies of remarriage of the wife or death of either spouse to characterize the payments
as periodic, the Tax Court finally79 accepted the view that payments to the
wife that varied with the spouse's income made the specific sum undeterminable and hence periodic.80
The Treasury eliminated the tax court-circuit court conflict by stating
that where the installment payments are to be made within a period of less
than ten years they are to be considered periodic if they:81

70. CODE §71 (c) (1). See cases cited note 69 supra.
71. E.g., Frank P. Orsatti, 12 T.C. 188 (1949).
72. See Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d)
(3) (1957). The Tax Court in its earlier decisions held
that as long as the principal sum was calculable from the face of the agreements or from
the use of mortality tables, the sum was considered "specified in the decree' and hence not
deductible by the husband. E.g., J. B. Steinal, 10 T.C. 409 (1948).
73. J. B. Steinal, 10 T.C. 409, 411 (1948).

74. Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308 (1950).
75. 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
76. Commissioner v. Baker, 17 T.C. 1610 (1952).

77. Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1953).
78. Id. The circuit court was careful to point out that it was not willing to accept

all contingencies as characterizing installment payments as periodic, especially those that
could be predicted actuarially, such as the wife's death.
79. See James M. Fidler, 20 T.C. 1081 (1953). The court in Fidler cited William E.
Edmonds, 16 T.C. 110, 117 (1951), and American Coast Line v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d
665, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1947), as authority for its right to examine any reversal of its opinion

by the circuit courts and to decide, independently, whether to continue its prior course
or follow the reversal. See also Baker v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1610 (1952), rev'd, 205
F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Frank C. Smith, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1952), rev'd, 208
F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953); Myers v. Commissioner, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1163 (1952), rev'd,
212 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954).
80. John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948); Roland K. Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948).
81. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (3) (i) (1957).
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(1) are subject to any one or more of the contingencies of death
of either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change in the economic
status of either spouse, and
(2) are in the nature of alimony or an allowance for support.
The Treasury also stated that not only were payments subject to one of
these contingencies considered periodic,8 2 but these contingencies need not

be set forth in the decree or agreement but could be imposed by local law.8 3
Thus, the determination of whether installment payments are periodic may
once again depend upon local law.84
In common law states the death of either spouse terminates the obligation
to pay alimony.85 Courts of local jurisdiction have sometimes been granted
the power to modify alimony payments where equitable considerations arise,
such as a change in the economic status of either party.86 Thus, even if there
is no specified provision for contingencies in the agreement, local law may
impose contingencies making intended non-periodic installment payments
periodic.
In determining the amount of the alimony payment that is periodic
and therefore deductible by the husband, only that portion subject to the
contingency is considered.87 Hence, a lump sum payment, which was followed
by a series of lesser periodic installment payments,88 and a terminal payment
made to the wife upon her remarriage and preceded by a series of periodic
payments 9 have been distinguished from other payments and held not to be
periodic.90 The language limiting the application of section 71 to periodic
payments rather than lump sum payments or installment payments of a
principal sum was intended to ensure that the economic benefit to the wife
would not be materially lessened by graduated tax rates. 91 Moreover,
82. Id.
83. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (3) (ii) (a) (1957).
84. See Alton F. Loundsbury, 37 T.C. 163 (1961), aff'd, 321 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1963);
Rev. Rul. 59-190, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 23.
85. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1953).
86. See generally Rev. Rul. 59-190, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 23. In Florida, installment payments, the principal sum of which is to be paid over a period of ten years or less, will be
periodic because of the imposition of contingencies due to local law. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1963), held that obligations to pay alimony are terminated with
the death of either spouse. Moreover, Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 241, §16 gives the courts power
to modify alimony payments under certain circumstances.
87. James M. Fidler, 20 T.C. 1081 (1953); Joseph D. Fox, 14 T.C. 1131 (1950).
88. See Arthur B. Baer, 16 T.C. 1418 (1951). See also F. Ewing Glassgow, 21 T.C. 211

(1953).
89. Commissioner v. Senter, 242 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1957), aJJ'g 25 T.C. 1204 (1956);
Jean Cattier, 17 T.C. 1461 (1952).
90. Knowles v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Miss. 1960), afJ'd per curiam, 290
F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1961). Non-reoccurring or lump-sum payments are more in the nature
of a property settlement than support payments. 182 F. Supp. at 155. See also Edward
Bartsch, 18 T.C. 65 (1952), where another reason given for separating lump-sum payments
from periodic or reoccurring payments was that the payments were treated differently in
separate sections of the agreement.
91. H. RUDICK, TAx CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE AND ITS TERMINATION 106 (1964).
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where a large lump sum payment is made the income from the payment
rather than the payment itself will normally be used to maintain the receiving spouse. Levying an income tax in such circumstances on non-income
property would be difficult to justify.92 Even in those circumstances where

the lump sum or installment payments are periodic the payments must be in
the nature of alimony or an allowance for support in order to be deductible
by the husband.

9

3

Alimony or Support Payments
The final requirement under section 71 is that the payments be made
in discharge of a legal obligation imposed because of the family or marital
relationship.- As in tie case of periodic payments, the Code's failure to
supply a guide to tie nature of the requisite legal obligation has generated
substantial confusion. In the broadest sense, an obligation arising out of the
marital relationship may include not only the wife's right to support but also
her rights in property acquired during the marriage and her rights in jointly
owned business operations.9" Nevertheless, the Regulations 8 and subsequent
cases include only those payments in the nature of, or in lieu of, alimony
9
within the purview of section 71. 7
Traditionally, alimony has been considered a provision for the support
and maintenance of the wife. 98 In William M. Haag99 alimony was held to
include payments in settlement of the couple's property rights as well as
the wife's right to support. The weight of authority, however, holds that
property settlements are per se not within the purview of section 71 and
that payments resulting from such settlements are not deductible by the

92. Id.
93. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (3) (i) (b) (1957). The term "alimony" is not found in the
Code. Although Congress used the phrase "family or marital relationship" as a substitute
for the term "alimony," the Treasury was not satisfied with the possibility of broad interpretations of "family or marital relationship" and thus limited the characterization of
installment payments by requiring such payments to be for support of the wife.
94. CODE §71 (a). The phrase "legal obligation" is controlled by applicable state law and
is not a federal standard. Allen Hoffman, 54 T.C. 1607 (1970). The husband's payments to
his wife for her support are not deductible by him nor includible by the wife unless the
payments are required by controlling state law. Thus, voluntary payments made by the
husband are not deductible for federal income tax purposes. Wondzell v. Commissioner,
350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965).
95. See Note, Alimony Tax Treatment: Support, 22 HAsrims L.J. 53, 58 (1970).
96. Treas. Reg. §1.71-1 (d) (3) (i) (b) (1957).
97. E.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.), af'g 38 T.C. 84 (1963).
98. Dayton v. Dayton, 290 Ky. 418, 161 S.W.2d 618 (1942), asserted that the duty and
moral obligation of a husband was to maintain a wife if he was the cause of the severance
of the marriage. A few courts have avoided the tort approach and have turned to contract.
Thus, in one jurisdiction it has been suggested that alimony was an assessment of damages
in favor of the wife for breach of the marriage contract. Driskill v. Driskill, 181 S.W.2d
100 (Mo. App. 1944).
99. 17 T.C. 55 (1951) (although the payments were in settlement of the wife's
property rights they were held to be alimony payments).
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husband. 00 Whereas alimony is concerned with the support of the wife, a
property settlement determines the rights of each spouse in the joint and
separate property of the marriage. 01' Naturally, while the husband would
prefer the payments to be classified as alimony in order to receive a deduction, the wife would prefer that installment payments be classified as
property settlement and therefore excluded from her income.
Allowing the husband a deduction for alimony payments and not for
payments in settlement of other marital rights has generated a surprisingly
large area of conflict in the determination of which marital related payments
are alimony payments. 0 2 The determination of whether the installment payment arises from a marital relationship or from a settlement of property
rights is a federal question.10 3 Determination of this question, even by a
state's highest court, is not controlling for tax purposes. 0 4 It therefore becomes necessary to examine those factors that the Tax Court has found influential in characterizing payments as either alimony or a property settlement. Those factors include the specificity of the agreement or decree requiring the payments, 0 5 the controlling state law,10 and the nature and
07
timing of the installment payments.
Specificity of the Agreement or Decree Requiring the Payments. The
labels used by the parties in classifying the installment payments are not
binding on either the taxpayer or the federal government but, in some
instances, are considered strong evidence of the parties' intent.108 Where
there is a clear expression of the parties' intent in the agreement, such as
separate provisions for the settlement of the wife's support and property
rights, the Commissioner will generally not look beyond the face of the agreement or decree.10 9 Where the expression of the parties' intent is vague,
ambiguous, or hidden, however, the Commissioner will go beyond the
agreement and consider extrinsic evidence." 0

100. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960); Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d
341 (5th Cir. 1955); James McEvoy, 21 CGH Tax Ct. Mem. 1441 (1962).
101. E. H. Mills, 54 T.C. 608 (1970). The husband not only will be denied a deduction
for payments in settlement of property rights but may also have to recognize a gain on
the transaction. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
102. See generally Note, supra note 95.
108. E.g., Phinney v. Mauk, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'g 280 F. Supp. 167
(S.D. Tex. 1967).
104. E.g., Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1959) (the Florida
supreme court's determination that the payments were part of a property settlement was
irrelevant for tax purposes).
105. See notes 108-123 and accompanying text infra.
106. See notes 124-155 and accompanying text inIra.
107. See notes 156-158 and accompanying text infra.
108. John S. Thompson, 22 T. C. 275, 281 (1954).
109. See 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 80, at 6, acquiescing in B.C. Newbury, 46 T.C. 690
(1966).
110. Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966). See also Brantley L. Watkins, 53
T.C. 849 (1969).
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One example of such ambiguity is the integrated divorce settlement,
which provides that the payments are in settlement of both the wife's
property and support rights.11 ' The vagueness created by this type of
agreement must be resolved by resorting to extrinsic evidence, for only the
portion that qualifies as support is within section 71.112 The Commissioner
is also forced to go beyond the face of the agreement in those states where
the husband has no duty to support the wife after divorce."13 In such a state,
if a wife relinquishes her right to support in return for a contractual right
under an agreement, the payments may be held to be in discharge of the
marital obligation of support even though the payments are described as
pursuant to a property settlement.114
Due to peculiarities in either local law or the negotiatory process between
the parties,"15 the written agreement will not be conclusive as to the
character of the payments if the true intent of the parties is not apparent
from the face of the agreement. Thus, where the payments are described
as a property settlement in order to circumvent local law,"16 facts indicating
that the payments were actually made in discharge of the husband's support
obligation may be controlling."' 7 Although such payments may not be modified by the divorce court, they may nevertheless be deductible by the
husband.

118

When an integrated divorce agreement is utilized to provide a settlement
for both the wife's property and support rights, the agreement should
specify the amount allocated to each purpose. This allocation may be highly
persuasive as to the character of the payments," 9 or at least constitute a
strong indication of the parties' intent. 20 However, where the payments
are disguised there must be sufficient extrinsic evidence to justify the treatment of what purports to be a property settlement payment as a support
payment.' 2' Moreover, where the payments are disguised or ambiguous a full

111. Cf. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 842 (9th Cir. 1960).
112. Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448, 449 (1966). In Hazel Porter testimony
concerning the negotiations between the parties disclosed that payments were to continue
until the wife was eligible for Social Security and that an earlier termination of the payments was expressly avoided in order to make the wife's remarriage more likely. Id. at
449-50.
113. See, e.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 845. See also Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963);
Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966).
116. Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968). While property settlements are fixed by the
parties, judges in some jurisdictions have the discretionary power to modify alimony payments. Consequently, parties often seek to avoid the uncertainty of discretionary modification by labeling all payments as property settlements.
117. See Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
118. Id.
119. B.C. Newbury, 46 T.C. 690, 695 (1966).
120. John S. Thompson, 22 T.C. 275, 281 (1954).
121. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F-2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1960). See also cases cited
in note 115 supra.
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evidentiary hearing is required 122 and the court will consider the controlling
state law and the nature and timing of the payments in order to determine
12 3
their true character.
Controlling State Law. The property rights of the parties to a divorce
differ significantly depending on whether they are within a common law or a
community property jurisdiction."2 Although the predecessor of section 71 25
originated from a congressional desire to provide a uniform system of taxation for alimony payments," 6 the courts must turn to state law to characterize a property interest as either community property, joint property, or
1 27
separate property.
In a community property state the wife has a one-half interest in every8
thing acquired through the earnings of the husband during the marriage."2
Although this is a marriage-related right, payments in settlement thereof do
not come within section 71.129 Consequently, a wife in a community property
state may have substantial property rights that can support her assertion that
payments are in discharge of property rights rather than support obligations.
The wife could therefore exlude the payments from her taxable income
and preclude the husband from taking the corresponding deduction." The
courts examine many factors when determining the character of such payments: the equality of the division of the community property, the presence
or absence of contingencies, and the similarity of the post-decree payments
to the pre-divorce support payments. Courts in community property states
are inclined to determine independently whether the community property
has been equally divided."' l Upon finding that the community property
has been divided equally"' - or that the wife has received a greater share of
the property than required,"' s the subsequent installment payments will be

122. See Mills v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 608 (1970).
123. Phinney v. Mauk, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969); John S. Thompson, 22 T.C. 275
(1954). See also notes 124-130 and accompanying text infra.
124. Cf. John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 8,15 (1964). In a community property
state the wife has a one-half interest in the husband's business, while in common law jurisdictions she does not automatically receive such an interest.
125. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §22(k), 56 Stat. 816 (now CODE §71).
126. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
127. Riddel v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960); Ann. H. Ryker, 33 T.C. 924
(1960). See also Note, Taxation of Alimony, 16 HAsrINGs L.J. 608, 618-19 (1965).
128. Cf. John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1964).
129. See Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d
551 (5th Cir. 1950); B. C.Newbury, 46 T.C. 690 (1966).
130. CODE §§71 (a), 215 (a).
131. See, e.g., B. C. Newbury, 46 T.C. 690 (1966). The most liberal view is that the
division of community property is essentially a function of the negotiatory process. Thomas
E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361, 367 (1949); Willet Parry, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1772, 1775 (1965).
The Tax Court, however, has frequently examined the division in order to characterize
subsequent installment payments. Grant R. Bishop, 55 P-H TAx CT. MEM. DEc. 73 (1971).
132. Willet Parry, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1772 (1965).
133. See B. C.Newbury, 46 T.C. 690, 695 (1966).
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characterized as support. 3 4 However, even if the wife receives less than an
equal division of the community property, subsequent installment payments
may be characterized as support if the primary consideration in formulating
the agreement was the support of the wife. 135
Another factor considered in the determination of whether the payments
are for support or in settlement of community property rights is the contingent nature of the installment payments. The presence of a contingency
negates the impression that the payments are permanent and thus indicates
that they are for support.3 0 However, in other instances courts have not
been fully persuaded by the presence of a contingency and have held the
3
payments to be in settlement of property rights.1 7
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the dassification of installment payments in community property states, the parties should distinguish between
the portion of the payment intended to discharge the support obligation
from that intended to effect the community property settlement. By distinguishing these amounts the parties maximize their control over the
character ascribed to the installment payments.
In a number of common law jurisdictions the concept of alimony has
been changed by statute to include payments in settlement of property
rights. 138 Payments specifically made under these statutes may not, however,
be wholly classified as alimony for tax purposes. 139 Where the alimony and
property settlement payments are lumped together in one series of payments
in order to circumvent state laws that allow modification of alimony payments, only the portion paid for the wife's support is deductible by the
husband.940
In common law states marital property is usually owned jointly;'14 but,
as in community property states, installment payments made after an unequal division of the marital property may be characterized as a property
settlement payment. 14 2 Nevertheless, the tendency to characterize such payments as property settlement payments is not as strong in common law states
because the wife's property rights are ordinarily not as extensive as her

134. Id. at 696. See also Grant R. Bishop, 55 P-H TAx Cr. MFM. Dxc. 73
Willet Parry, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1772 (1965).

(1971);

135. Ann H. Ryker, 33 T.C. 924 (1960); C. T. Jones, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1385 (1961).
136. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960); Ann H. Ryker, 33 T.C. 924
(1960).
137. John S. Thompson, 22 T.C. 275 (1954); William Wells-Lee, 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1217 (1966).
138. Cf. Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 184 (1849); Kraft v. Kraft, 193 Iowa 602, 187 N.W.
449 (1922); Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64 N.E. 567 (1902); Brown v. Brown, 156 Tenn.
619, 4 S.W.2d 345 (1928).
139. William F. Hagenloch, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 722 (1967). In such instances it
becomes necessary to separate the support portion of the payments from the property
settlement portion. Id. at 725.
140. See generally Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. 349 (1969).
141. H. Runicm, TAx CONSEQU.NCFS OF MARRIAGE AND ITs TERMINATION 59 (1964).
142.

Enid P. Mvirsky, 56 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 460 (1971).
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community property counterpart. 143 Moreover, installment payments that
are subject to the contingencies of death or remarriage of the wife are more
likely to be characterized as support payments in common law jurisdictions
44
than in community property states.1
Common law jurisdictions also differ from community property jurisdictions in the characterization of a wife's claimed interest in her husband's
business. Although community property states require that the wife receive
an automatic one-half interest in her husband's business, 145 the common
law states will hold otherwise unless the wife has acquired a special equity
in the business.146 On several occasions a wife has argued that, since the
installment payments were received in settlement of an equitable interest
that she had in his property, the payments were not includable in her gross
income.' 47 The basic issue thus becomes: Under what circumstances will the
wife obtain an equitable interest in her husband's property? In determining
whether the wife has acquired such an interest the courts have developed
the "substantial contributions" test.

48

This test requires the wife to make

a substantial contribution to the husband's business through her efforts,
industry, and skill before an equitable interest will arise. 49 Although the test
requires the contributions of the wife to be more extensive than those performed as an ordinary housewife, she does not have to actually work in the
business to acquire the requisite interest. 15
However, the Tax Court has generally been unreceptive to the wife's
claim of a business interest where the interest was not recognized by the
parties nor settled in the dissolutionment proceedings.' 5' On the other hand,
even though the divorce court recognizes the wife's interest in her husband's

143. Compare Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959), with Riddell
v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. 349
(1969).
144. Cf. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960). If the amounts are
small, then payments contingent on the wife's death may be treated as support without
any allocation of a portion of it to the wife's property rights. In community property
states, however, a segregation of this payment is likely.
145. Cf. John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1964).
146. Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966). See also Wilma Thompson, 50
T.C. 522 (1968).
147. Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968); Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953); Hazel
Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966). If the installment payments arise from a business relationship or a purchase of assets they generally will not qualify as being in discharge of the wife's support. Thoresness v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5898 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1958); Jerome Bates, 34 T.C. 121 (1960).
148. Cf. Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87 (1919); Tanner v. Tanner, 194 So.
2d 702 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
149. Cf. Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932); Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla.
252, 83 So. 87 (1919); Tanner v. Tanner, 194 So. 2d 702 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
150. McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968); Charles S. Presbrey, 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1970). Making a loan to the husband for use in his business
(McCombs) or encumbering property that previously had been unencumbered to aid the
husband in his business (Presbrey) gives rise to such an equitable interest.
151. See Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968); Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953).
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business, such a determination is not conclusive for tax purposes. 152 The Tax
Court has been primarily concerned with the intent of the parties with
respect to this equitable property right. 5 3 Although the payments were
admittedly for purchasing the wife's interest in the husband's business, the
court in Jerome A. Blate5 4 found that the payments were for the wife's
support because the wife had surrendered her interest to keep the family
business intact for the children. Similarly, where the wife claimed that the
payments were in settlement of her interest in the family business, the court
in Mauk v. Phinney- 5 inferred that the payments were for the wife's support because the business' liabilities exceeded its assets. Since such matters
are presumed settled in the state court, a wife's claim of an equitable
interest must arise in the divorce court before the Tax Court will consider
the argument. Moreover, even when a business interest has been recognized
by the lower court, the circumstances surrounding the disposition of this
recognized interest become important in classifying subsequent payments as
either a support or property settlement.
Nature and Timing of the Installment Payments. The nature and timing
of the installment payments may also be influential as to the parties' intent.
A large first year distribution does not conclusively determine the character
of the payment. It is strong evidence that the parties intended a property
settlement. 5 8 Gases featuring a large initial payment are more often decided
on the basis that the payment is not periodic,

57

however, than on the ground

that the payment is not in discharge of a support obligation. Nevertheless,
if a substantial payment comes after the entry of a court decree, it would
not be unreasonable to find that a property settlement was intended.158
Indirect Installment Alimony Payments. The taxability of installment
payments made indirectly to the wife depends on whether the wife received
any economic benefit from the payments.59 Such indirect installment payments include the payment of utilities,160 the payment of the taxes and
152. Hazel Porter, 25 CGH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966).
153. Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968); Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953); Hazel
Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966).
154. 34 T.C. 121 (1960), acquiesced in 1961-2 Cum. BuLi. 4.
155. 280 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Tex. 1967), rev'd, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969). While
the appellate court remanded the case for further inquiry into the intent of the parties
and the true substance of the transaction, the status of the business also had to be determined in order to adjust the wife's interest therein and aid in the characterization of
the subsequent payments.
156. Mary Schwab, 52 T.C. 815 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1971). See also
F. Ewing Glasgow, 21 T.C. 211 (1953).
157. Helen L. Hilgemeier, 42 T.C. 496 (1964).
158. E.g., Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968).
159. E.g., Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953).
160. Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 17; Rev. Rul. 58-52, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 29.
Alimony allocated to payment of utilities for the residence is considered includable in the
wife's income and deductible by the husband where the wife is in exclusive possession of the
residence. Deinenger v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1961).
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insurance on the residence of the spouses, 61 and the payment of life in62
surance premiums paid by the husband on a policy owned by his wife.'
To the extent such indirect payments confer benefits upon the wife they are
generally considered support payments and, if periodic, are deductible by
1 3
the husband. '
CONCLUSION

The tax treatment of installment payments of alimony is an area that demands certainty and consistency in order to give the parties involved an
opportunity to allocate sufficient income to the party who is to bear the
brunt of the tax burden. The many pitfalls surrounding the taxability of
such payments cannot be avoided by a cursory reading of the Code. Moreover, the lack of federal guidelines with regard to installment payments
have forced the courts to turn to state law for determination of several of
the problems that arise under the Code.-6 Inconsistency and uncertainty
have therefore resulted.65 Nevertheless, certain principles can be used as
guidelines providing the parties with some measure of control over the tax
treatment of installment payments. By recognizing the appropriate tax
principles involved in the taxation of alimony installment payments, the
practitioner is able to offer sound tax planning advice to achieve the most
beneficial results for his client.
ROBERT C. JOYNER

161. See H. RUDICK, supra note 141, at 112. If the wife is the sole owner of the residence, installment payments of taxes and insurance will be deductible by the husband and
included in the wife's income. However, if the husband has some right of survivorship
in the residence no part of the payments for taxes or insurance are deductible as alimony payments. Rev. Rul. 62-38, 1962-1 GUM. BULL. 15. Generally, a divorce reduces a
tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common, and therefore the husband would be
allowed a deduction for one-half of the payments of insurance and taxes.
162. Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953). Insurance premiums paid
on a policy insuring the husband and owned by the wife are included in the wife's income
and deductible by the husband only if he names the wife as irrevocable beneficiary and
gives up all ownership and control over the policy. If the payment of the insurance proceeds is contingent or the policy is solely for the purpose of securing the alimony payments,
the wife will not be taxed on the income and the husband loses his corresponding deduction. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950); J. P. Bradley, 30 T.C. 701
(1958).
163. See notes 159-162 and cases cited therein, supra.
164. See notes 29-39, 83-86, 94, 124-155 and accompanying text supra.
165. See Note, supra note 127, at 618-19.
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